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III
In discussing the effectiveness abroad of the nationalization
of the banks, especially the dissolution of the Joint Stock banks,
first those states will be treated that have not yet recognized the
Soviet republics.
i. On two assumptions only may the judge of such a state
leave unconsidered the dissolution of the J. S. banks:
(a) if jurisprudence and court practice of that country ex-
plain the juristic personality of Joint Stock companies by the
theory of a fictitious juristic person. If the juristic personality
of a J. S. company rests merely on a legal fiction, then-if the
old law only is recognized-it is immaterial whether the real
organization still exists.
(b) in the other case, if nationalization and all its legal
consequences, especially the dissolution of the Joint Stock banks,
is contrary to the public order of that country.
United States courts still take the stand that the nationaliza-
tion decrees are contrary to public order and are incompatible
with the North American view of law. This view has already
been mitigated, 1 3 and it is to be presumed that it will be entirely
abandoned now that Germany, England, France, and even
Italy,10 4 have given up this reservation of an international-pri-
vate-law character.
' See decision of the Court of Appeals of New York, Fred. S. James & Co.
v. Second Russian Insurance Company, 24o N. Y. 581, 148 N. E. 713 (1925),
supra note 7.
104 See the decision of the Roman Court of Cassation, May 25, 1924. IL FoRo
ITALIANO (1924), 451.
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Although, according to old precedents, the Soviet decrees
are, on principle, disregarded in the United States, and although
the old Russian law is considered as still existing, even the Amer-
ican judge will be unable to disregard the dissolution of the Rus-
sian Joint Stock banks,105 for Anglo-American jurisprudence fol-
lows the so-called organic theory of the real corporate entity. A
corporation which in effect is no longer in existence, independ-
ently of the question whether the law effecting its dissolution
must be considered or not, will, on principle, not be recognized
by the Anglo-American judge. In the James case the question
at issue is whether the foreign branches are to be considered as
actively legalized and capable of suing and being sued. This ca-
pacity of a branch is only a derivative one, yet the American
judge admits it temporarily for reasons of equity, because the
branch actually is engaged in business. "It may be decided later-
whether the capability still exists." In Russian Reinsurance Com-
pany v. Stoddard, et al.,'00 the Court of Appeals of New York
has not yet answered this question. The decision rests on the
assumption that the old J. S. banks continue to exist in effect as
corporations, no longer in Russia, but in Paris. Starting from
this foundation, the court thinks it may disregard the Soviet-Rus-
sian decrees, especially since the non-recognition of Soviet Russia,
and public order, on principle, prohibit the application of these
decrees.
Whether the old Russian J. S. companies continue to exist
in France, remains for further investigation below. But before
the recognition of the Soviet state French jurisdiction was very
consistent. The former Russian Empire and its laws were re-
garded as still existing. French jurisprudence generally explains
the juristic personality of the Joint Stock companies by the theory
of fiction. If the old law was recognized. the juristic persons
created by it had also to be recognized. The maintenance of the
old organization, the co6ptation of new members of the direc-
torate by an executive committee whose term of office had ex-
105 "The alarming position abroad of Russian corporations of the old regime,"
37 HARV. L. Rav. 6o6 (1924).
10 24o N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 7o3 (0925), supra note 3.
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pired, the transfer of the domicile of the Russian J. S. com-
panies into France was regarded as contrary to the statutes, it
is true, but justified by "'force majeure." 107
The Swiss Confederated Court, which likewise adopts the
doctrine of the real corporate entity, has considered the old J. S.
banks as dissolved, in spite of the non-recognition of the Soviet
republics, and does not consider even the Swiss branch as legit-
imized. On principle, the Swiss courts disregard Soviet legislation.
In spite of this, the Confederated Court, without adducing the res-
ervation of private-international law, makes its decision depend
solely on the question whether the real corporate entity of the J.
S. banks-formerly legally recognized-continues to exist in So-
viet Russia or has been destroyed by the Soviet state. The court
recognizes the effectiveness of the Soviet decrees, though, for the
rest, it denies on principle the normative effectiveness of Soviet
legislation.
2. The House of Lords was compelled to apply the Soviet
laws and, after the precedent of Luther v. Sagor 10" could not
claim that the decrees of nationalization are contrary to English
public order. Following the Swiss view that the branch is part
of the main house and legally inseparable from it, the highest
English court could not rest satisfied with recognizing the legal
standing of the English branch temporarily for reasons of equity.
Rather it had to go back to the principal question and to in-
vestigate whether the old J. S. banks had retained their juristic
personality. In this, the House of Lords faced a double diffi-
culty: first, it had to decide the question for the moment of the
instant judgment, July 22, 1924; second, it would not suffice to
establish the fact that the J. S. banks continue to exist as ficti-
" See M. Champcommunal, La condition des Russes a I'ttranger, spiciale-
ment en France, XIX REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 331 (1924). The
Italian courts had ceased to apply the old law even before the recognition of
Soviet Russia by Italy. A judgment, Tribunale di Genoa, May 19, 1923, called
the old law a "cadavere legislativo," 50 JoUR. DU DR. INT. (CLuNET) 1021
(923).
1, Supra, note 5.
I
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tious juristic persons because the Soviet decrees did not expressly
withdraw this right from them. 0 9 The English view sees
the nature of a legally recognized corporation on principle in the
real corporate entity, not created by the law, but merely recog-
nized by it. While the American decisions presuppose the effec-
tive economic existence of the J. S. companies, the House of
Lords, in conformance with the old precedents, considers it sufli-
cient that the legal personality of the organization, the association
as such, still exists, regardless of whether it exercises its eco-
nomic functions or not.
The House of Lords considers the decree of December 14,
1917 as merely a general political declaration; the decree of Jan-
uary 26, 1918 is considered insufficient, for the reason that the
annulment of the shares contradicts the surrender and transfer
of the shares to the People's Bank ordered at the same time. It
is true that the domestic court, according to an often enunciated
maxim of international private law, is not bound to follow the
foreign interpretation in applying foreign laws.110 Nevertheless,
the House of Lords apparently distrusts its own interpretation
to a certain extent and Lord Cave adduces as an additional sup-
port the fact that the decree of January 26, 1918, was given
only by the Council of People's Commissars, but'not by a legis-
lative body."' In this the English judge manifestly errs; for
Art. 38 of the constitution of the R. S. F. S. R. of July io, 1918,
expressly bestows upon the Council of People's Commissars the
right to issue decrees and ordinances of all kinds. Lord Cave
further supports that interpretation with the argument that the
decree of January 26, 1918, in his opinion, could not confiscate
any shares belonging to persons not subject to Soviet jurisdiction.
'But the English court came much nearer to this view in adducing in the
interpretation of the Soviet decrees that provision of the Swod Sakonoff which
in my view has been abolished, and, following the Russian experts who start
from the "fiction" theory, it declared that a J. S. company could juristically be
dissolved only by a special act of the state.
" See PH T, TRAIT- PRATIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV- (Paris,1923), I, ISI; v. BAR, THEORIE UND PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-
RECHTS (Hannover, 1889), I. 138; A. WVnss, TRAITE THEtORIQUE Xr PRATIQUE DE
DROIT.INTERNATIONAL PRIVV (Paris, 1912), III, 187, 196; also A. HADIcHT, IN-
TERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (Berlin, I9o7), 44.
lu [i925] A. C. 124-5-6.
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Since there was a large number of such shares, he assumes that
the corporation has not perished.
The uncompensated expropriation of foreigners is inadmis-
sible in international law. But the expropriation is not ineffec-
tive. It is only necessary to grant to the foreigner a preferred
position by giving him compensation, as compared with the do-
mestic owner, who is expropriated without such compensa-
tion. 112  But the R. S. F. S. R. in the provisional commercial
agreement with Great Britain has declared itself ready in prin-
ciple, to compensate the Englishmen expropriated by Soviet de-
crees. Accordingly, Lord Cave's argumentation, in so far as it
refers to the shares of Englishmen living in Russia, cannot be
supported by that international law maxim, even disregarding the
fact that this maxim does not touch upon the real effect of the
expropriation.
A different question is whether the shares of foreigners liv-
ing outside of Russia could be expropriated by decrees of the
Soviet government, so that the argumentation of the English
judge must be interpreted as only referring to this. Expropria-
tion is an act of state sovereignty; a state can only perform acts
of sovereignty within its boundaries, and beyond these, only as
regards its own citizens. However, we must ask, is the annul-
ment of a share an expropriation? As a security, the share is
treated in many respects as subject to maxims of real law, but
principally it represents membership viewed as right of personal-
ity, and the participation in the property of the company, as re-
gards property rights, is only secondary. The House of Lords,
in other places, very often emphasizes that the confiscation of
property can not touch the "legal entity" of the J. S. compa-
nies.113  The participation in property rights, which is insepar-
able from the right of membership, does not constitute ownership
'A. VERDROSS, Zur Konfiskation auslaendischen Privateigentuim nach
Friedensvoelkerrecht, ZTSCER. P. OEFF. RcEcHT, Year IV (1924), Vols. 3 and 4,
321 et seq.; DESPAGNET, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (4th ed.), 487;
also A. Sm'uPP, DAS VOELKERECHTLICHE DIE)iT, 118.
'That the prohibition of industrial activity renders the right of participa-
tion permanently valueless and has for its indirect consequence the dissolution of
the J. S. company, has not been considered by the House of Lords and need not
be enlarged upon again here.
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nor any other real right in the property -of the. company., It 'is
merely a quota of the basic capital, specially secured by the abso-
lute right of membership. But. the basic capital, the totality of
the statutory contributions of the members, is a special obligation
of the company, as an independent unity, toward the members.
The property-right element of the share is only "a claim to that
part of the value of the proceeds of liquidation,114 which corre-
sponds to the quota of the basic capital."
Accordingly confiscation, and annulment, of a share is noth-
ing but uncompensated abolition of a personal right and of the
conditional obligatory claim indissolubly connected with it. The
maxim of international law that things belonging to foreigners
and situated abroad cannot be expropriated does not prevent the
international effectiveness of the decree of January 26, 1918. But
that the abolition of a membership right, originating in Russia
and to be exercised only there, and of a claim indissolubly con-
nected therewith, 'likewise originating in Russia and only execu-
table there, should be ineffective for the English judge, with
the additional fact that the Soviet state, on principle, assures
the English citizen of a compensation-that seems dubious.
The interpretation of the decree of January 26, 1918, "on
the confiscation of the- stock capital of the former private banks"
adopted by the House-of Lords rests solely on the freedom.of in-
terpretation of the foreign judge, which is not entirely uncon-
tested. Lord Cave's argumentation from international public law
can support this interpretation as little as his argumentation from
public law which contradicts the clear verbiage of the constitution
of the R. S. F. S. R.
The House of Lords, indeed, interprets the decree of Jan-
uary 26, 1918, thus: the shares of the J. S. banks found in Russia
were to be transferred to the People's Bank and a property mer-
ger was decreed, which was carried out later on by the instruction
of December io, 1918.115 But it does not conclude therefrom
that during the course of this fusion the private J. S. companies
" LEHMANN-HENINGR, LEHRBUiCH DES HANDELSRECHTS (1921), 315; see
also BE GEL, BUCHFUERRUNGSRECrXT DER AXTIENGESELLSCHAnTEN, 3.
u Supra, note 51 and text, p. 4o5.
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were dissolved as independent organizations. Lord Finlay says
verbatim "it is clear that an amalgamation can be carried out
without annihilating the existence of the amalgamated corpora-
tions." That is incontestable. Practically, however, a presump-
tion speaks against it and the entire wording of the instruction
of December io, 1918, will justify this interpretation. It is true,
the House of Lords had not before it the circular letter of Au-
gust 30, 1921, completing the liquidation, nor the preceding ordi-
nances of June 30, 1918, February 6, i919, March 4, 1919, July
14, I919, so that one may perhaps assume that the Lords would
have reached a different decision, had they known them. 116 From
the declaration of the law on the completion of the nationaliza-
tion and liquidation, even from the standpoint of the House of
Lords, the conclusion was inevitable that the J. S. companies
which were in process of amalgamation and liquidation were dis-
solved, commencing August 30, 1921. Dissolution is also indi-
cated by the recodification in the code of Civil Law, coming into
force on January I, 1923.
Still another point appears unintelligible. A foreign juris-
tic person, according to the doctrines developed in the interna-
tional private law of all states, is recognized only, if it is recog-
nized in its native state, or in the state of its domicile. Recognition
is only granted if agreed upon by a treaty between the respective
states, specifically by a treaty of commerce-this is the French
and the Russian view 117-or per se, as the English judgment
says, from reasons of the comity of nations, because the foreign
juristic person is recognized as legal in its own state-that is the
English and the prevailing German view.1 s According to Eng-
" Supra, notes 48 to 56 and text, pp. 404 to 408.
"' S. PILLET, op. cit., supra, note 110, Vol. 2, 802, 817; idem, DES PERSON-
NES MORALES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVI (Paris, 1917), I86; WEISS, op. cit.,
supra, note 110, Vol 2, 483; F. StIRV-LLE, COURS ELEMNENTAIRE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PRIVP (Paris, 1925), 715 et seq.; KLIBANSKI, HDBCH, Vol. 3, rem. to
par. 2139, note 2, 308; P. WAUVERMANS, Les sociLtjs anonymes itrangares en
Russie, REv. DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 71, 496 (1905); BARON BORIS
NOLDE OTSCHERK MESHDUNARODNAWO TSCHASTNOWO PRAWA (Outline of inter-
national private law); appendix to LISZT'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Russian ed.
Riga, 1923), 5o6 et seq.
" WESTLAKE-BENTWICHI, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922), 369 et seq.;
DICEY (1922), 163 et seq.; ZITELMANN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHIT, VOL. 2,
116 et seq.; REICEISGERICHT 83/369; v. BAR, op., cit., supra, note io, Vol. I,
I
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lish international law, therefore, the recognition of a foreign
juristic person is an act of courtesy toward the state which oriii-
nally has granted legality to it. If the House of Lords, mani-
festly disregarded these maxims, it appears' that for politico-
legal reasons it wished to render an unusual decision, 'which 'imy
be equitable, but can be used in juiispruderite only with the
greatest caution. Nothing would have been siniipler for the Eng-
lish court than to inquire of the Soviet Russian officials whether
the juristic personality of the old J. S. banks: was still to be'rec-
ognized. There is no doubt that the reply would have been decid-
edly negative. But if, since the de facto recognition 'of Soviet
Russia, equal in the prevailing English view to de jure recogni-
tion, Soviet Russian personal statute law applies to Russian physi-
cal persons, the same doctrine will have to be applied to Russian
juristic persons. Those Russians who have not recognized the
Soviet state are considered in England'as without a country since
the decree of December 15, 1921. But a juristic person without
a country is unthinkable.11
The same reasoning applies to the judgment of the Kammer-
gericht, which intentionally follows the House of Lords. The
Kammergericht, too, in the opinion of many, is 'bound by no
interpretative norm in interpreting the Soviet-Russian law: But
not only did it disregard the circular letter of July '92i, and the
before-mentioned ordinances of 19i8 and 1919, but, in contrast
with the House of Lords, also disregarded the instruction of De-
cember io, 1918, though this was before it at the time. This was
the sole method by which it could reach the decision that the
302; MAMMELOK, Din JURiSTISCHEN PERSONEN IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-
RECHT (Ig00), 35; SCHWANDT, ZmrrscHRrr F UER AKTENRECHTwESEN (19M),
32; G,. WALKER, INTERNAMIONALES PRIVATRECHT (Wien, 1921), 128 et seq.;
HABICET, op. cit., supra, note io, at 83.
"' Rakowski, Russian chargi d'affaires in London, declared publicly after the
decision, that the interpretation of the House of Lords was at variance with the
Russian interjretation: "According to the legislation of thelUnion of Soviet
Socialist Republics now in force, all banking institutions and firms instituted on
the basis of former Russian laws terminated their existence as independent legal
persons, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom, from the date when the
laws relevant to the matter entered into force." Whoever was carrying on trans-
actions contradicting this view, was violating the interests of the Soviet Union,
and the same be hereby warned. See v. MENDELSSOH'-BATHoLY,- op. cit.,
supra, note io, at igig.
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former J. S. banks were still in existence as juristic persons in
the spring of 1922.
The reasoning of the Kammergericht rests also on the fact
"that the Soviet government has not yet claimed the property
values of Russian banks abroad as property of the Soviet repub-
lic." Whether, with regard to the proceedings in France, this
will remain so, may be left undiscussed. At any rate, it is not
apparent why the banks should be treated differently from the
other Joint Stock companies. The decree of March 4, 1919,
nationalized the shares of the other nationalized J. S. companies.
The Soviet state has already laid claim to the foreign property
of other J. S. companies. Of the claims made before the deci-
sion of the Kammergericht, several were made before the Amer-
ican Admiralty Courts, demanding the surrender of nationalized
ships.120 The claims of the Soviet state were rejected. But the
fact that they were made proves that, in principle, the Soviet state
lays claim to the foreign property of the nationalized J. S. com-
panies. 121 If the Soviet state has not yet claimed the foreign
property of the former banks, this rests practically on the cir-
cumstance that the foreign property of the former banks in the
main was precisely in those states which had not yet recognized
the Soviet government.
The House of Lords thinks that neither the decree of De-
cember 14, 1917, nor the decree of January 26, 1918, relates to
the foreign branches. It assumes that these foreign branches
were not to be subjected to the process of liquidation ordered in
the instruction of December 19, 1918, although the Petrograd
main house, under the old firm style, but as a department of the
People's Bank, has tried to give instructions to the London
branch. The court concludes that the plaintiff company, in spite
of the complete expropriation in Russia, remained the owner of
the English branch. The question whether the organization of
the old banking company is still effective was not discussed by
"' The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (E. D. N. Y. i92i); The Rogday, 278 Fed. 294,
279 Fed. 13o (N. D. Calif. 1920).
" A. KANTOROWITSCH, op. cit., supra, note I7, at I42 ; see A. GOIcHBARG,
EZHEDNIEVNIK SOWJETSKOI JUSTIZMI (1925), No. 24, 858 et seq.
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the court. It merely investigated the power, of attorney of the
London branch manager and reached the conclusion that the
correspondence of the Petrograd main house, as department of
the People's Bank, with the English branch showed the confirma-
tion of this power of attorney; no distinction can be made between
dealings with a foreign state or with a private foreign director
(Lord Atkinson). Perhaps this formulation tends-to show that
the English judge does not consider the continuance of the com-
pany quite free from doubt. Lord Finlay, in case the power of
attorney of the English branch manager should prove extinct,
wishes to treat him as manager of the liquidation "of' those in
control, of the English branch" and carefully avoids the ques-
tion whether the organization of the old company can still be
recognized. But Lord Wrensbury states: even assuming that the
old company had ceased to exist, it would, in any case, have to
be considered in England as a '"liquidating company" under civil
law. It is also significant that Champcommunal, who has con-
siderable scruples about applying the decrees of nationalization,
in discussing the decision of the House of Lords 122 stresses just
this argument of Lord Wrensbury which starts from the extinc-
tion of the former juristic person.
The decision of the House of Lords has produced a merely
temporary solution. The power of attorney of the English
branch manager cannot be maintained indefinitely and Lord Cave
points to the fact that the liquidation of the company has been
ordered and the Official Receiver has been appointed liquidator.
The only question is, how the dissolution of the old company shall
be effected, especially since it follows indirectly from the judg-
ment that no remnants of the former organization exist. Appa-
rently the totality of the English shareholders is to be considered
as a liquidating company of the only task is to distribute among
the former shareholders the property of the former J. S. bank
situated in England, under the form of a liquidation ordered by
the court. If the old banking companies, as is here assumed, do
no longer legally exist, this would have created merely formal
Champcommunal, op. cit., supra, note io7, at 546.
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difficulties for an order of liquidation. Even if the decision of
the House of Lords had been rendered differently, a trustee
might have been appointed for the property of the English
branch. In the end, the question of the fate of the foreign branch
will depend on this, whether the property of the old banking
companies situated abroad has fallen to the Soviet state or to
whom it otherwise belongs.
The French court practice faces special difficulties. So far,
in France the Russian companies, which are economically very
important, have been considered as continuing in existence and
every occurrence connected with the Soviet revolution has been
justified by "force majeure." 123 Scruples about this have been
voiced recently. It has been objected that the notion of "force
inajeure" is applied only to the discharge of debts. 1 24  Before
the recognition of the Soviet republic these objections could not
make themselves heard.
But since the recognition, in connection with the receivership
ordered for the Russian banks in Paris, the French standpoint
has been changed materially. The order of receivership is
charged to the most divergent causes 125 and is being energetically
attacked. Apparently it is a measure of public safety. The mo-
tion of the Procureur de la Republique, October 22, 1924, says :128
"In view of the fact that since the revolutionary events
in the old Russian Empire certain goods and rights are found
ownerless.
"' Trib. com. Seine, May 20, 1921: Kharon v. Banque pour le commerce et
l'Industrie, 50 JOUR. DU DR. TNT. (CLUNET) 533 (1923) ; Trib. com. Seine, Jan.
I6, 1922: Banque russe pour le commerce 6tranger, 50 JOURL DE DR. INT. (CLuNET)
539 (1023) (the court recognizes the transfer of the Directorate to France) ;
Trib. c,-,m. Seine, April 26, 1922: Vlasto v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, 50 JOUR. DU
DR. INT. (CLUNET) 933 (1923) (the directorate is declared to have the power
of coiptation into the executive committee) ; Grouber and Tager, 51 JOUR. DU
DR. INT. (CLUNET) 21 (1923) (the old executive committee remains despite the
termination of the term of office).
' WAHL, LE DROIT CIVIL ET COMMERCIAL DE LA GUERRE, Vol. 3, 223 et seq.
' Some assume that the officials have been moved to this step by one of two
disputing groups of shareholders, others suppose that it is a step of the French
organization of creditors of Russia; that has been denied in the meantime.
Others again believe that the state has intervened. See La siquestration des
banques russes ou autres, 3 REVUE DE DROIT BANCAIRE, 49 et seq.
"" Supra, note 2o and text, p. 394.
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In the relevant decree of the president of the Seine court, it
is presupposed that the suit deals with ownerless objects and
rights where the competence is doubtful. The decree has been
attacked because the matter at issue is a general measure in which
the individual objects and rights have not been separately named.
The permissibility of such measure under civil law had already
been energetically attacked in the French literature in the case
of the receivership ordered for German property during the War.
At the time, Barault in a comprehensive study proved that the
order of a general receivership (ordonnance de s~questre ginral)
does not conform to the "mesure r~glementaire" declared inad-
missible by Art. 5 Code Civil.127 ' This view has prevailed and the
order of October 22, 1924 is therefore generally considered
legal.1
2 8
But the receivership does not affect the company as such,
as has been often erroneously assumed.12 9 It does not interfere
with the business transactions and the organization of the com-
pany, but refers only to the "ownerless objects and rights."
The second order, November 29, 1924, which extended the
receivership of the first order to the property of the French
branches of all Russian companies, specifically of the banks which
in Russia are subject to the legislation of the R. S. F. S. R., con-
tradicts the first order to a certain degree. The first order deals
only with the administration of ownerless property. The second
order speaks of "rights and interests retained or exercised by all
Russian companies," so that one has the impression that it deals
with the property of definite persons, while the first order relates
precisely to ownerless property.
This seeming contradiction is removed by the official mo-
tion underlying the second order. This second order transcends
"' BARAULT, Essai sur la thiorie ginirale de l'administration des bsess des
sujets ennemis, REV. DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV- (I919). The "mesure rigle-
mentaire," it is commonly held, presupposes an indeterminate number of persons
and relates to future, still uncertain, events; it corresponds thus to an adminis-
trative measure.
' A. Perret, Le siquestre des banques russes en France, 6 REcuEIL jum-
DIQUE DES SOCILTLS, 57 et seq. (1925).
121 A. MATER, 3 REV. DE DROIT BANCAIRE 55 (1925) ; P. WoHrL, 5 OSTEU-
ROPA MARKT 6 (1925).
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the first and starts from the premise "that the legal status of the
French branches is dubious and a statutory management of the
old companies is impossible." Now the general French assump-
tion is that the old J. S. companies have been abolished by Soviet
Russian law,' 30 that the French branches, which depend on the
legal fate of the main houses, cannot continue to exist and that
the property of former Russian J. S. companies has been trans-
ferred to the Soviet state according to the Soviet law.''
From this the most divergent conclusions are drawn. Champ-
communal assumes that the nationalization decrees, at least in-'
so-far as they order the dissolution of the J. S. companies, are
acts of state sovereignty and effective only within the S. S. S.
R.13 2 According to him, the French judge need not regard them,
for the simple reason that they were issued in favor of one party.
He refers for this to Pillet 133 and states the maxim that not only
purely political laws, but also special laws of a public-law char-
acter which wish to advance the property interests of a single
person and make lawless a whole class of persons, are ineffective
for the foreign judge. Champcommunal holds that this maxim
is international legal usage. As examples he quotes the fact that
the attempt to extend the sequestration of enemy property or-
dered by the belligerent states to property situated in neutral
countries were rejected by the judges of these states. In addition
he supports his contention by two Paris decisions from the last
century: the first case deals with the confiscation of the property
of the Duke of Brunswick. The court refused to extend the
order of confiscation to the property of the duke situated in
France.134  In the second case the court refused to apply an
ukase of the Tsar which in 1845 had declared forfeited the prop-
' Champcommunal, op. cit., supra, note x07, at 362; Perret, op. cit.,
supra, note 128, at -52; apparently also Andri-Prudhomme, La reconnais-
sance en France du gouvernement des Soviets et ses consiquences juridiques, 52
JoUp. DU DR. INT. (CLUNET) 321 (1925).
1 Andr6-Prudhomme, op. cit., supra, note 13O, at 364; Perret, op. cit.,
supra, note 128, at 6o.
.2 Chanpcommunal, op. cit., supra, note io7, at 364.
," Pillet, op. cit., sura, note I1O, at 731; "Le droit international n'admet
pas qu'une disposition lgale, inspire par des moments purement politiques,
puisse produire des effects a '6tranger."
Paris, Jan. 16, 1836, 2, 70.
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erty of Count Potocki.13 5 He adduces also the suits connected
with the expropriation of the monks of Chartreux. The foreign
courts rejected the claims of the French liquidators for the rea-
son that the transfer of the trade-mark of the liqueur and the
right of exclusive manufacture to the French state were based
on a political-social law.136 Champcommunal even refers to Art.
297f (!) of the peace treaty of Vei-sailles, where the return
of the property of subjects of the Allied and Associated Powers,
taken by German war measures ("Uebertragsanordnungen) is
demanded!
Diverse objections may be raised. The adduced criteriur
of Pillet (disposition l6gale inspir~e par des motifs purement poli-
tiques) is relevant unconditionally for all quoted cases, but
Champcommunal's own criterium is not. The confiscation of the
property of Count Potocki, who was the head of the Polish move-
ment for freedom against the Tsar, is a political act. The Tsar
intended to make the revolutionist Potocki politically harmless,
the motive of personal enrichment was only secondary. For the
banishment of the monks .of Chartreux the purely political mo-
tives, postulated by Pillet, were determining: it was a war meas-
ure in the fight with the Roman Church. But regarding the Art.
297f of the Versailles treaty, it seems to prove rather the con-
trary, for all "Uebertragsanordnungen" of the Allied and
Associated Powers remain in force and Germany is obliged to
recognize them.
To apply Pillet's criterium, we ought to establish that the
nationalization decrees of the Soviet government are purely politi-
cal acts. But the nationalization legislation is the foundation of the
entire private and public legal order of Soviet Russia (see par. 19
and 59, note i of the Russian Code of Civil Law). The idea of
a political law is colorless. A law is political, if, without immedi-
ate connection with the entire private and public legal order of a
country, as a special law it intends merely to advance the immedi-
" 'Trib. civ. Seine, May 7, 1873, JOURNAL DE DROIT PRvY (1875) 20.
%LG. Hamburg, Dec.. ii, i9o8, JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVP
(19o7) 525.
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ate interest and the power of the state.137 When the decrees of
nationalization were issued, all law was valid only "in so far as it
harmonized with the social-revolutionary and Bolshevist party
program." The abolition of private property in the means of
production, a demand raised also by the socialists of other coun-
tries, was the programmatic basis of the new revolutionary legal
order and a determining administrative maxim of the Soviet state.
The nationalization legislation was an important part of the new
system, but no special legislation; it served principally the erec-
tion of the new economic organization. Add to this, that most
nationalization decrees, specifically the decrees on nationalization
of the banks, originated from purely economic considerations un-
der the stress of war, counter strike and boycott.13 If for the
Marxists these economic considerations differed from those cus-
tomary in the France of today, this difference is not proof of the
political nature of those laws.
Neither does Champcommunal's own criterium apply to the
Soviet Russian nationalization legislation. For these laws are
not special laws of a publico-legal character which intend to ad-
vance solely the property interest of a single person, viz., the
communistic party. The expropriations were not made for the
benefit of the communistic party, but for the common benefit.
Even the state itself acquired no private fiscal property by
the nationalization. The nationalized property was devoted to
the common advantage and received a new publico-legal con-
tent. 3 9  Champcommunal's criterium is a mere variation of
Pillet's, by assuming for a law selfish motives in the legislator.
If one assumes'selfish motives for the nationalization laws, then
the programs of all socialist parties must be called selfish. Kli-
banski spoke of a "hypertrophied" idealism of the Soviet legis-
lation. 
4 0
See REHM, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE, 8 et seq.
Wjestnik Narodnawo Komnmissariata Torgowli i Prommyschljennosti,
June I, 1918, No. i, p. 43.
Supra, note 87 and text, p. 534.
a4 KLIBANSKI, J. W. (1920) 6o6; FREUND, 51 JOUR. DU DR. INT. (CLuNEr)
54 et seq. (1924).
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It would be different, if Champcommunal would argue that
the Bolshevist legislation created a "privilegium odiosurn" for
the nationalized banks. Because of his connection with the
Potocki case, his arguments have been erroneously interpreted
in that sense.141 Foreign countries do not recognize the privi-
legium odiosunt. But did the Soviet Russian decrees of nationali-
zation create a privilegium odiosum? Certainly not for the indi-
vidual persons to which they applied. ALL the bourgeois, indus-
trials and merchants are treated unfavorably in the nationalization
legislation. But we may not even speak of a special law for in-
dustrials and merchants: the entire bourgeois class as such, all
persons not sustaining themselves directly from wages, are de-
prived of certain public rights, and private industrial or commer-
cial activity, which is typical for them, is generally limited or
prohibited, independently of the class to which they belong. This
general "political fight" legislation, which relates not so much to
the social position of the person as to a definite kind of activity,
destroys the boundaries of a privilegium odiosum, 4 2 for the
old common law was no longer valid. The war-communistic
legislation had the same transitory character in regard to pri-
vate law as, let us say, the legislation of the German war admin-
istration of an economic character. 143 Already on May 22, 1922,
the decree on maxims of private law in reference to property
rights restored the foundations of the law of private property.
At the most, Champcommunal's objections might be supported
by the "ordre publique," and it might be said that the nationaliza-
tion legislation as an entity was contrary to the public order of a
bourgeois state.
Andr6-Prudhomme has likewise taken refuge in the notion
of "ordre publique." 144 But he does not extend it to exclude by
the clausula of reservation the Soviet legislation in its entirety,
"' Wom, J. W. (1925) 1300.
"Paulus, Digest I, 3, r6: ius singulare est quod contra tenorem rationis
propter aliquam utilitatem auctoritate constituentium introductum est. If the
old "ratio," the old common law was no longer valid, one cannot speak any more
of a "hus singidare odiosum."1'Supra, notes 72 to 76 and text, pp. 53o and 531.
"'Andrd-Prudhomme, op. cit., supra, note 13o, at 322.
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he reserves for the French judge the right to decide from case
to case whether the Soviet law is contrary to the "ordre pub-
lique." If, however, Andr6-Prudhomme assumes that the res-
ervation of international private law will be applied with the
greatest frequency in reference to the decrees of nationalization,
the view of the French state does not justify the assumption.
The idea of "ordre publique" is determined by points of view, not
only of private law, but chiefly of public law. Even though the
French judge is independent, he will not be able in a concrete
case simply to disregard the idea of public order maintained by
his own state.
We have already mentioned that the courts of the most im-
portant states have given up the objection that the decrees of na-
tionalization are contrary to public order. Is it to be imagined
that the French jurisdiction will retain the old maxim in opposi-
tion to that of Germany, England, Italy, Scandinavia? Perret,
and quite a number of other authors, assume that the "ordre
publique" can no longer be used in objecting to the decrees of
nationalization. It appears that the Procureur de la R~publique
-and that means the French ministry of Justice also-has this
conception, for otherwise the sequestration motions of October
22, 1924, and of November 20, 1924, are unintelligible. Mean-
time it has been established by Soviet Russian sources, that during
the negotiations between Krassin and the French government,
preceding the de iure recognition of Soviet Russia and connected
with a Franco-Russian commercial treaty, it was expressly agreed
that the French government should see to it that the courts should
no longer oppose the "ordre publique" to the Soviet decrees.' 4 5
In Esthonia, where the vicinity of the R. S. F. S. R. is likely
to afford a more direct legal view than in West Europe, there has
never been any doubt that the old Russian J. S. companies were
dissolved by the nationalization decrees of the Soviet government.
'"A. KANTOROWITSCE, in the official periodical SOWJETSKOJE PRAWO (1925) ,No. 3, 41, gives an account of the treatment of the branches of juristic persons
of the former Russian law abroad and mentions that the decision of the Tribu-
nal de la Seine in re Bunatjan v. Obtorg, which refused to apply the Soviet
Russian law of nationalization on account of the "ordre publique" had for its
consequence the departure of Krassin and his commercial delegation. See 5i
JouL. Du DR. INT. (CLuNer) 133 et seq. (1924).
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As early as 192o, an Esthonian law was passed "concerning the
administration of those Joint Stock companies and associations
confirmed by the Russian government, which have owned prop-
erty or enterprises within the borders of the Esthonian state."
These companies were to call a general stockholders' meeting
within two months after the passage of the law. If this did not
take place, then the enterprises of the company were to be con-
sidered res nullius. This law was supplemented by an ordinance
of 1921, which simply orders a receivership for the property of
the old Russian J. S. companies. The ordinance states expressly
that the old J. S. companies no longer exist. This applies also
to the J. S. banks.
4 6
A Latvian law of July 31, 1924, states that "the former Rus-
sian J. S. companies, active before November 18, 1918 in the
Latvian territory, must be liquidated in accordance with their con-
stitutions." The law gives as the reason for this the fact that
the old J. S. companies are no longer "represented in a statutory
or legal fashion." 14T Thus Latvia supposes that there are still
remnants of the organization of the old J. S. companies and is
going to liquidate these in accordance with special rules.
This approaches the standpoint of Champcommunal, who
however proposes liquidation according to the old statute and the
old law.148  But this would prove possible only in the rarest in-
stances. Whether such a liquidation is at all admissible in France
depends on the question to whom the foreign property of the for-
mer J. S. companies belongs. In Esthonia and Latvia, according
to the peace treaties with Soviet Russia, all Russian state prop-
erty has been transferred to that state in whose territory it was
found on the day when the treaties were concluded. Legally,
Esthonia and Latvia are therefore in the position that they can
consider the property of the former J. S. companies found within
their territories either as belonging to themselves or, considering
domestic shareholders, as res nidlius and seized by the state, as
far as no other right is opposed to it.
'"E. Hunnius, Das Schicksal der russischen Aktiengeseltschaften in Est-
land, I GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSPRAXIS DES AUSLANDES 71.
I ZFITSCHR. F. OSTEUROP. RECHT 93 (1925).
" Champcommunal, op. cit., supra, note io7, at 366.
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IV
The legal fate of the foreign branches of the old Russian
J. S. banks depends, in the last analysis, on the question to whom
the property of the dissolved J. S. companies situated abroad be-
longs. Three possibilities are imaginable:
i. It may be assumed that the foreign property of the old
J. S. banks has become res nidlius. This necessitates two prem-
ises:
(a) that the old banks have lost their status as juristic
persons and have no longer any legal standing even abroad;
(b) that the nationalization decrees have not trans-
ferred the property situated abroad to the Soviet state.
2. The stand has also been taken that the foreign property
of the former J. S. banks has reverted to legal successors-under
private law-of the old J. S. companies, who, under the old firm
style, form a civil company of foreign law. The premises for
this are:
(a) that the foreign property has reverted to those
liquidation companies of civil law without a special act of
transfer;
(b) that either the nationalization decrees do not re-
late to the foreign property or that, from reasons of inter-
national public law, they cannot be applied with reference
to this foreign property.
3. A further possibility is that the foreign property of the
old J. S. companies, just like that within Russia, has been trans-
ferred to the Soviet state.
The first conception is represented by the Esthonian legis-
lation. But the Esthonian law probably has to do with the fact
that, in the peace treaty between Esthonia and Soviet Russia,
the transition of the Russian state property situated in Esthonia
to the Esthonian state was agreed upon. If the law urged the
shareholders to call a general stockholders' meeting within the
brief space of one month (two months above), this was presum-
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ably done merely to secure the rights of the Esthonian share-
holders and of those companies which now were preponderantly
controlled by Esthonian citizens.
The motion of the Procureur de la R~publique, of October
22, 1924, also designates the property of the old J. S. companies
situated abroad as res mdlius. But both Perret and Andr6-Prud-
homme assume that this rests only on the fact that the order of
the president of the Tribunal de la Seine was issued six days
before the de iure recognition of Soviet Russia. At that time it
was impossible to assume that the foreign property of the old
J. S. companies had been transferred to the Soviet state. Both
authors consider the ordinance of October 22, 1924 a measure of
security on the part of the French state, which recognizes indeed,
that the property of the old J. S. banks situated in France, has
been transferred to the Soviet state, but for reasons of public
interest wishes to protect the claims of the French creditors
against the Russian state, as is also mentioned in the motion of
the French authorities, and which will oppose the claims of the
French creditors to the Soviet state claims of surrender. The
former president of the Russian liquidation commission expressly
says that the intention is to procure a pledge in favor of the
French holders of Russian securities (de constituer un gage en
faveur des porteurs frangais de valeurs russes). To treat the
foreign property of the old J. S. companies as res nullius would
result practically in very awkward situations. The recognition
of the Soviet state by France is retro-active. 149 Accordingly, for
seven years property rndlius had been disposed of. The debtors
of the old J. S. companies would have fulfilled their obligations
to persons not entitled thereto. A countless number of lawsuits
would follow and these conditions, so irremediably confused,
could be cleared up only by a constant application of the exceptio
doli prtesentis and by considerations of equity of every sort.
Lord Wrenbury was the first to state the thesis, in the deci-
sion of the House of Lords of July 22, 1924, that the property
situated abroad had reverted to the liquidation companies under
" Ibid., at p. 340.
642 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
civil law which had replaced the old J. S. companies, provided
it were to be assumed that the old J. S. companies had been dis-
solved. Possibly the argument of Lord Wrenbury that a foreign
J. S. company is to be treated at home like a domestic company
of civil law, and that its juristic personality granted by the for-
eign state is recognized only for reasons of international law,
corresponds to English law. But it appears doubtful that every
foreign J. S. company should at the outset be divided into a civil
company of domestic law and a juristic person of foreign law.
One might just as well say that every domestic J. S. company is
a company of civil law which by certain organizing legal acts
acquires in addition the right of a juristic person. Such a view
is contrary to the prevailing opinion. True, before the J. S.
company is legally existing, the members form a civil company.
But this company has the sole purpose to establish a Joint Stock
company. As soon as the Joint Stock company has been formed,
the civil company perishes and does not -continue to exist along-
side of the new Joint Stock company-this corresponds also to
the prevailing theory of identity. When a domestic Joint Stock
company has been dissolved, there remains a liquidation company,
the so-called Joint Stock company in process of liquidation. This
liquidation company is merely the continuation of the old Joint
Stock company and still possesses its juristic personality, which
is, however, limited to those transactions required for the purpose
of the liquidation.
Lord Wrenbury's thesis, rightly interpreted, presupposes
that the place of the old Joint Stock companies has been taken
either by foreign liquidation companies with limited legality, or
by foreign associations without such. If, according to Art. IO,
div. 2 of the German E. G. B. G. B., the rules for the company
are applied to foreign unrecognized associations, this rule pre-
sumes that there existed abroad at least an association lacking
legal standing. According to the prevailing German view, Ger-
man right of association must be applied to a foreign association
which lacks legal standing.150 Apparently however, Lord Wren-
u' KULmENFBEC, note a to Art. io E. G. B. G. B.; NIMEDN, note 7; HAB-
ICHT, 31.
NATIONALIZATION OF BANKING CORPS. IN RUSSIA 643
bury is not satisfied with treating the foreign, no longer legally
qualified, associations at home like domestic companies of civil
law. He wants to comprise the domestic former shareholders,
"those in control of the English branch," in an independent Eng-
lish company of civil law.
The Soviet Russian Joint Stock companies, especially the
banks, lost their juristic personality without first going through
a regular process of liquidation. Nor can the former sharehold-
ers, according to Soviet Russian law, be considered private com-
panies, or associations, without legal standing; for the purpose
of such an association, viz., the liquidation of the property of the
nationalized J. S. company, would have been illegal. It has been
repeatedly assumed, 15 1 that after the nationalization, at least out-
side of Russia, a private liquidation company remained; this
rests on two very dubious suppositions: (a) that actually a suffi-
cient number of former shareholders are still to be found, (b)
that the foreign property of those dissolved J. S. companies has
not been transferred to the Soviet state.
In most cases only a small fraction on the former share-
holders came together abroad and .the former directorate hardly
existed anywhere in full. One cannot understand why a chance
meeting of a group of shareholders or of the former directorate,
should form a private company to which the property of the
perished J. S. company should have been transferred by uni-
versal succession ex lege, without a special process of law.
The second supposition is still more dubious.1 52 To take the
stand of Lord Wrenbury that the foreign property of the former
J. S. companies has not been transferred to the Soviet state be-
cause it belongs to the liquidation companies of foreign law suc-
ceeding them, is anticipating what ought to be proved.
One solution offers itself: undoubtedly, the foreign share-
holders might form a company of civil law. The fact that they
continued abroad the business of the old J. S. companies justifies
the assumption that they intended to take over the administration
of the foreign property of the J. S. companies under the legal
WORL, J. W. (1925) 1300.
"'Supra, note 121 and text, p. 630.
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form of a civil company. During the time of non-recognition of
the Soviet state, a foreign state was by no means able to assume
that the ownership of the property of an old Russian J. S. com-
pany situated in its territory had been transferred to the Soviet
state. On the other hand, the old J. S. companies no longer existed
in Russia. If, with the Swiss Confederated Court, one follows
consistently the doctrine of the real corporate entity of the so-
called juristic personalities, one cannot deny the factual effective-
ness of the dissolution of the old J. S. companies by the legislation
and administration of the Soviet state. Accordingly, the prop-
erty of those discontinued J. S. companies, as far as it was found
abroad, had become res mdlius, at any rate until the recognition
of the Soviet state. The new company of shareholders and the
old directorate took over the administration of this property; in
this one might see an appropriation recognized by the state. In
this case, those remnants of the organization of the former J. S.
companies did not remain owners of the property abroad of the
J. S. companies, but became such, which, as a practical result, is
the same.
This solution meets with two objections. First, the intention
of these former shareholders and members of the directorate
uniting abroad was not to form a new company of foreign civil
law and to appropriate for themselves the property of the old
Russian J. S. company. Second, in those states which had not
yet recognized the Soviet state the property there situate of the
old Russian J. S. companies has not been considered res nullius.
This would contradict the French view particularly, which de-
clares the juristic person as a fictitious person created by the law.
As far as the appropriation presupposes state recognition or the
renunciation by the state of the exercise of its prerogative of
appropriation, such recognition, or such renunciation, has no-
where been expressly declared nor has it been silently presup-
posed. For these reasons, the above solution must be rejected
although certain considerations of equity would seem to favor
it. Practically, the solution proposed is opposed by the uncon-
trollable accidental composition of the organizations of the for-
mer companies found abroad.
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There remains then only the third possibility, viz., that the
foreign property of the old J. S. companies has been transferred
to the Soviet state exactly like the Russian property. Against
this may be urged the legal character of the nationalization as
developed in the domestic Russian practice. The state acted as
a sovereign person, as the bearer of the supreme power, not as
fiscus. The law of nations forbids a state to exercise functions of
sovereignty in the territory of another state, except where the
so-called "international law" right of the official diplomats, etc.,
is concerned. But one must interpret the nationalization legisla-
tion and administrative practice in this sense, that the Soviet state
intended only to transfer to itself, as fiscal successor in law of the
old J. S. companies, their foreign property. This, indeed, has
been repeatedly stated on the part of Soviet Russia.153 In sev-
eral instances the Soviet state has sued abroad for the surrender
of the property of the former J. S. companies.154 Only thus can
it be explained that the main houses in Russia, after being trans-
formed into departments of the People's Bank, attempted to cor-
respond with their foreign branches. The nationalized main
houses have issued instructions to the foreign branches. These
have replied; an attitude which would be absolutely unintelligible
between enterprises independent and legally separated from each
other.'55 Now that the French government has declared that it
intends to treat the French property of the old Joint Stock com-
panies as belonging to the Soviet state-though this is not abso-
lutely binding on the courts which are independent of the govern-
ment-we are obliged to consider the transition to the Soviet state
of the foreign property of the former Joint Stock companies as
the most satisfactory solution.
Dr. Paul Wohl.
Berlin, Germany.
'A. KANTOROWITSCH, supra, note 17; cf. KLUTSCHNIKOW, INTERNATIO-
NALE ANNALEN (Russian, 1924), No. I, 13 et seq.; IGELSTRON, MESHDUNAROD-
NAJA ZHISN (1923), No. i.
Supra, note 24 and text, p. 395.
" A. KANTOROWiISCH, op. cit., supra, note 17, at 42; [1923] 2 K. B. 636
et seq.
